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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case 
by virtue of Utah Code Annotated, 78-2a-3 which states that the 
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from 
District Court in criminal cases except for first or capital 
degree felonies. 
(v\ 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a criminal case. Defendant 
Baird was charged with unlawfully possessing in excess of 
16 ounces of marijuana contrary to Section 58-37-82 (a) (i) 
U.C.A. as amended, a third degree felony. 
A motion to suppress and trial were held in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court for Juab County, State of Utah 
before the Honorable Boyd L. Park. Defendant Baird1s motion to 
suppress was denied and defendant Baird was tried without 
a jury and found guilty by Judge Boyd L. Park. 
(vi) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
May a police officer lawfully stop and seize the driver 
of an automobile when the sole reason is that he has 
unartricuable feeling that a validation sticker on the 
license plate is "not right"? 
May a police officer lawfully continue the seizure of 
an individual after the initial belief for stopping that 
individual and automobile was in error? 
May a police officer lawfully continue investigating a 
driver and his automobile after the police officer's 
initial belief for stopping the driver and automobile 
has disappeared? 
Must evidence which was obtained in violation of an 
individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 
of the Constitution of the State of Utah be suppressed? 
Does a search for an automobile, although designated 
an inventory search become an invalid investigatory 
search when the actual intent of the police in conduct-
ing the search is to find contraband they believe to be 
in the automobile? 
Does the warrantless inventory search of the locked 
trunk of an automobile constitute a search in violation 
of defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights and for his 
rights under the Utah Constitution? 
(vii) 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of the United States 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effectf against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated/ and no warrants shall 
issuef but upon probably causef supported by Oath or 
affirmationf and particularly describing the place to be 
searched^ and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of the United States 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof/ are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside* No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of lifef liberty or 
property/ without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Constitution of Utah 
Article If Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
housesf papers and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searchedf and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is a criminal case. Defendant Baird was charged 
with unlawfully possessing in excess of 16 ounces of 
marijuana contrary to Section 58-37-82 (a) (i) UCA as 
amended, a third degree felony. 
B. Course of proceedings below 
Prior to trial, a Suppression Motion hearing was held 
on the 8th day of May, 1987 before the Honorable Boyd L. 
Park. Defendant Baird moved to suppress all evidence obtained 
from the defendant's automobile. The motion was denied. 
Judge Boyd L. Park prepared an Order and Findings with respect 
to his denial of Baird1s Motion to Suppress. The case was 
tried without a jury before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on 
May 20, 1987. 
Defendant Baird through his counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga, 
renewed his Motion to Suppress at the beginning of the 
trial. Judge Boyd L. Park again denied Defendants Motion 
Suppress and the evidence of the marijuana was admitted. 
The court found the Defendant Baird was guilty as 
charged. 
Time for sentencing was waived and the matter was 
referred to Adult Probation and Parole Department. 
(ix) 
C. Disposition at Trial 
The honorable Boyd L. Park found that the Defendant, 
Richard B. Baird was guilty as charged, 
P. Statement of Facts 
On February 9, 1987f Officer Paul Mangelson, an 
officer with the Utah Highway Patrol was parked in the 
media of 1-15 under the "junk pile overpass" near the Mona 
overpass in Juab County. (Suppression Hearing Transcript 
pages 5 & 6). 
Officer Mangelson was parked facing southbound 
traffic, parallel to the freeway and was clocking vehicles 
with a radar unit and observing vehicle inspection stickers 
and registrations. (Suppression Hearing Transcript p. 6) 
At approximately 3:45 p.m. Officer Mangelson observed 
an automobile moving in a northerly direction in the inside 
lane of traffic. (Suppression Hearing Transcript pgs. 6 & 
18.) 
Officer Mangelson noted that the automobile had 
Arizona plates on it. Officer Mangelson noted that the 
automobile had a front plate on it and as it passed him he 
noted that it had a rear plate on it. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 6) 
Officer Mangelson stated that as the car went past him 
he paid further attention to it because "I noticed the 
(x) 
registration, the decal on the rear plate that it didn't 
appear to be valid so I pulled out and pursued the vehicle 
to see if it was a valid plate.11 (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 7.) 
Officer Mangelson followed the car for approximately 
one mile and then stopped the vehicle with the use of a red 
spotlight. (Suppression Hearing Transcript page 7.) 
When the car pulled off the road and stopped. Officer 
Mangelson drove his car directly behind the car in the 
emergency parking area. (Suppression Hearing Transcript 
page 8.) 
Officer Mangelson stated that he knew of no traffic 
violation committed by defendant Baird prior to stopping 
him and that he had observed no equipment violation with 
respect to defendant's automobile. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 17.) 
Officer Mangelson also stated that he had no received 
any transmission from any Highway Patrolman regarding 
either Defendant Baird or his car. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 17.) 
Officer Mangelson when asked whether or not he could 
see the validation sticker on Defendant Baird's vehicle 
stated, "I could not tell what it was, it didn't appear 
to be valid." (Suppression Hearing Transcript page 19.) 
When asked why he said "it did not appear to be valid" 
(xi) 
by defendant Bairdfs attorneyf Officer Mangelson states 
"It was down in the lower corner where it should be but 
something just struck me funny about it. It didn't look 
right." (Suppression Hearing Transcript page 19.) 
When asked again by the defendant's attorney why it 
didn't look right Officer Mangelson stated simply "Like I 
say it didn't just look right to me".(Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 19.) 
Officer Mangelson in response to questioning by 
defendant's counsel agreed that the only reason he followed 
defendant was because he couldn't tell if the sticker on 
the license plate was a 1986 or 1987 sticker. (Suppression 
Hearing Transcript page 8f 24, and 25.) 
This also was the general testimony of Officer 
Mangelson at trial. (Trial page 7) 
After Officer Mangelson stopped his car behind 
defendant Baird's carr Officer Mangelson exited his car and 
walked toward defendant's car. When he came within 
approximately fifteen feet of defendant Baird's car he 
noted that the license plate sticker was a valid 1987 
sticker. (Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 8, 24 and 25.) 
Officer Mangelson admitted that after he noticed the 
valid sticker he no longer had a reason for stopping 
defendant Baird. (Suppressin Hearing Transcript page 25.) 
Apparently Officer Mangelson had noticed new shocks on 
defendant Baird's automobile at approximately the same time 
that he noticed the sticker on the license plate was valid. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 26.) 
(xii) 
Officer Mangelson, at that point when he noted the 
valid license plate sticker and the new shocks, did not 
suspect Defendant Baird of any kind of wrongdoing. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 26.) 
After noticing that the sticker was valid Officer 
Mangelson continued to walk towards Defendant Bairdfs car. 
As Officer Mangelson got closer to Defendant's car he 
noticed that the tires were new, that on the rear floor of 
defendant's car was a jack and tire iron, and that a gas 
cap, which had been twisted off, lay on the rear seat. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 8, 9 and 26.) 
At about the time Officer Mangelson was about to talk 
to defendant Baird he also observed the keys in the 
ignition but didn't observe any gas cap key with the 
ignition keys. (Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 9 & 27.) 
Officer Mangelson admitted that all of these observations 
occurred after he had stopped defendant Baird's automobile. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 27.) 
Officer Mangelson then asked Defendant Baird, who had 
remained in his car, to produce his driver's license. 
Defendant Baird produced a Utah Driver's License. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 9.) 
Defendant Baird also produced a paper registration for 
the car showing that a person in Arizona was the owner of 
the vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript page 9 and 
Trial Transcript page 11.) 
(xiii) 
Officer Mangelson indicated that during this time he was 
talking to defendant Baird and he could detect the odor of Mari-
juana coming from the vehicle. (Suppression Hearing, page 27) 
Officer Mangelson asked Defendant Baird if he was carrying 
any drugs, alcohol or contraband in the vehicle or guns, and 
defendant Baird answered no* (Suppression Hearing, page 10) 
Officer Mangelson asked defendant Baird if he could 
search defendant's car and defendant B^ird indicated the he 
did have an objection. (Suppression Hearing, page 10) 
Officer Mangelson then returned to his own car, and 
checked to see if defendant Baird1s vehicle was stolen and 
who the registered owner of the vehicle was. (Suppression 
Hearing Transcript pages 29, 30, 32, and 32. Trial 
Transcript pages 12 and 13.) 
Officer Mangelson also asked for a driverfs license 
check on Defendant Baird. Officer Mangelson was advised 
that defendant Bairdfs license was suspended for financial 
responsibility reasons. (Suppression Hearing, page 11) 
Officer Mangelson went back to defendant Bairdfs car 
and advised him of the suspension. Officer Mangelson 
said it appeared that defendant Baird didn't believe him so 
Officer Mangelson invited the defendant to go to the patrol 
car to verify for himself that his license was suspended. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 11.) 
(xtv ) 
Defendant Baird exited his car. Officer Mangelson 
frisked him for weapons, and both of them sat in the patrol 
car at which time the police dispatcher verified that 
defendant Bairdfs driver's license has been suspended. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 11.) 
Officer Mangelson then advised defendant Baird that the 
defendant could not drive his vehicle and that defendant 
was under arrest for driving with a suspended license. 
Officer Mangelson then gave defendant Baird his Miranda 
rights. (Trial transcript page 13.) (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 11.) 
Officer Mangelson then arranged for a wrecker to pick 
up the defendant's car and transport it to Painter Motor 
Company in Nephif Utah. (Supression Hearing, page 11) 
After Defendant's car was picked up by the wrecker 
defendant Baird was transported by Officer Mangelson to the 
Public Safety Building in Nephi. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 12.) 
At the Public Safety Building defendant Baird was 
advised as to the amount of bail he would have to pay. 
Defendant Baird was unable to make bail. (Suppression 
Hearing Transcript page 12.) 
The keys to defendant Baird's vehicle were obtained by 
Officer Mangelson from the jail. (Suppression Hearing 
Trancript page 35.) 
(XV). 
Officer Mangelson was asked if Defendant Baird's car 
keys were taken without the knowledge and consent of the 
defendant. Officer Mangelson stated "I think that I told 
him I was going to have to do an inventory on his car." 
(Suppression Hearing Transcriptf page 35,) 
Howeverf Officer Mangelson admitted that he did not 
make any statement in his written report to the effect that 
he had indicated to defendant Baird that the police were 
going to conduct an inventory search of defendant's car. 
(Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 36 and 37.) 
Officer Mangelson admits that if he did talk to 
Defendant Baird about an inventory search it was simply to 
inform the Defendant Baird of the search and not to obtain 
his permission. (Suppression Hearing page 37) 
Officer Mangelson asked the County Sheriff/ another 
State Trooperf Dennis Avaryf and the County Attorney/ 
Mr. Eyref to go with him to conduct an inventory of 
Defendant Bairdfs car. (Suppression Hearing page 12-13) 
Officer Mangelson testified that the reason he asked 
the Sheriff/ Trooper Avaryf and Mr. Eyre to accompany 
him on the vehicle search was because Officer Mangelson 
suspected that defendant's vehicle contained marijuana. 
(Trial page 26.) 
(xvi> 
The above individuals accompanied Officer Mangelson to 
Painter Motor where defendant Bairdfs vehicle had been 
taken and conducted a search of Defendant Bairdfs vehicle. 
(Trial page 15 and Suppression Hearing Transcript page 13 
and 14.) 
A written list was made of items found in defendant's 
vehicle/ and photographs were taken by Officer Mangelson of 
the car and items in the car at this time. (Suppression 
Hearing Transcript page 13 and Trial page 15.) 
In the trunk of Defendant Baird's carr Officer 
Mangelson found 14 bags of green leafy material that he 
said appeared to be marijuana. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript page 14 and Trial page 17.) 
Officer Mangelson indicated that he opened one of the 
bags and found a green leafy material appearing to be 
Marijuana. (Trial page 17.) 
Officer Mangelson stated that the bags taken from the 
truck were tied by knots on the top of the bag and that the 
green leafy material was wrapped in a cellophane material 
inside of the bags. (Trial page 26.) 
Defendant's counsel/ Mr. Mitsunagaf stated that he 
would stipulate that if David Murdock were called to 
testify he would testify that the 14 bags were each found 
to contain crushed marijuana and the toal weight of the 
same were approximately 165 pounds. (Trial page 2.) 
(xvii) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The stop of Officer Mangelson of Defendant Baird 
was a seizure of Defendant and his automobile. 
The cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require that a 
police officer have articulable grounds to sustain a 
reasonable suspicion that the person seized has committed, 
is committing or will commit a violation of the law. 
Office Mangelson presented no articulable grounds as 
to why to believe a law had been or was being violated but 
to the contrary spoke in terms of something not feeling 
right. 
Such a reason as expressed by Officer Mangelson is not 
sufficient reason to justify his search of defendant and 
defendant's vehicle. 
B. Even granting arguendo that the initial stop and 
seizure Office Mangelson was justified, after he 
ascertained that the license plate decal was valid, he no 
longer had any reason to continue the seizure of Defendant 
Baird. Since the seizure by Officer Mangelson became 
invalid after Officer Mangelson ascertained that the 
license plate sticker was valid, all observations, 
questions to defendant Baird and the investigation of 
defendant Bairdfs driver's license and car registration 
(xviii) 
were tainted by the invalid seizure, and offered no grounds 
for the arrest of defendant Baird nor for the inventory 
search of the car. 
C. The so called inventory of defendant Bairdfs car 
was invalid because it stemmed from an invalid arrrest. In 
addition, the inventory was in fact an investigatory search 
whose intent was not that of making an inventory but rather 
of discovering if contraband were in defendant Bairdfs car. 
D. This search of defendant Baird's car consisted of 
opening the locked trunk of defendant Bairdfs car without 
his consent. The law has held that there is no need when 
making an inventory of entering a locked area such as a car 
trunk. Thus the warrantless search of the trunk of 
defendants car was made in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights and his rights under the Utah Constitution 
and any evidence obtained by such search should have been 




Evidence presented at trial was obtained by an un-
constitutional seizure and search. 
A. Officer Mangelsonfs actions of stopping defendant 
Baird and his car constituted a seizure within the meaning 
of the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution 
of Utah. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 
59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979); United States, v. Brignoni-ponce, 
422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United 
States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9 Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8 Cir. 1971); and State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 
B. Officer Mangelson did not have a constitutionally 
permissable reason to seize defendant. In Delaware v. Prouse, 
The United States Supreme Court held: 
"Accordingly we hold that in except in those situations 
which there is at least articulable and reasonable 
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an 
automobile is not registered, or that year the vehicle 
or the occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for 
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining 
the driver in order to check his driver's license and 
the registration of the automobile are unreasonable 
under the 4th amendment." 440 U. S. at 663. 
C. Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable and 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in 
criminal activity, past, present or future. 
-1-
A review of the transcript of the supression hearing 
shows that Officer Mangelson did not have a specific reason 
to believe that either the vehicle or the driver was in any 
way violating any law. 
Since this particular element of testimony of the 
officer is crucial to defendant's claim that the seizure 
was unconstitutional, the transcript is set forth. 
(Suppression Hearing, Page 6-7.) 
Q. Now can you describe the vehicle that you 
observed? 
A. The vehicle observed was a late model Cadillac. 
It was a vehicle that had Arizona plates on it. As it 
came by I noticed that it had a front plate and as it 
passed me I noticed that it had a rear plate. Now I 
clocked him on the radar at a speed of 56. It was a 
maroon colored carf shinyf nice looking automobile. 
Q. As the vehicle went past, did you pay any further 
attention to it? 
A. Yes. I did. 
Q. For what reason. 
A. I noticed the registration the decal on the rear 
plate, that it didn't appear to be valid to me so I 
pulled out after seeing this vehicle to see if it was 
a valid plate. 
Q. And how long did you follow that vehicle? 
-2-
A. I would say a mile. 
Q. Upon following the vehicle, could you make any 
further observation with respect to the registration 
plate? 
A. No. I could tell that the month on it was 12 but 
I could not tell if it was 1986 or a 1987 validation 
sticker. 
At the suppression hearing defendant's counsel 
cross-examined Officer Mangelson. 
Q. Officer, there was no traffic violation was there? 
A. You mean prior to stopping him? 
Q. That is correct. 
A. That is correct. 
Q. There was no equipment violation. 
A. None that I know of. 
Q. Or did you observe? 
A. No. 
Q. You haven't received any transmission from any 
patrolman in that whole day regarding this defendant's 
vehicle. 
A. No, I hadn't. (Suppression Hearing Transcript p. 17) 
A little further on in the cross-examination by defense 
counsel, defendant counsel asked: 
-3-
Q. Yes, you thenf at that time that the car was 
approaching you observed the Arizona license plate, 
and nothing wrong with that was there? 
A. No. 
Q. You observed the rear Arizona license plate and 
nothing was wrong with that? 
A. No. 
Q. You observed what you called a validation sticker 
or is that what you call it? 
A. Correct. 
Q. As the car passed youf you said you could not see 
or could you see the validation sticker? 
A. I could not tell what it was - it did not appear 
to be valid. 
Q. Why do you say, "it did not appear to be valid"? 
A. It was down in the lower corner where it should be 
be but something just struck me funny about it. It 
didn't look right. 
Q. Why didn't it look right, number one, you didn't 
even get close enough to discern what it was? 
A. Like I say, it didn't just look right to me. 
Q. Let me establish that, when the car passed you you 
saw a sticker attached to the Arizona license plate 
and it was in the location that it should have been, 
is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
-4-
Q. Okayf now at that pointf something struck you 
funny, is that what your testimony was. 
A. Well, I think my testimony was that I could tell 
the December but I couldnft tell whether it was 1986 
or 1987. (Suppression Hearing Transcript Pg. 18 & 19.) 
Again at the trial we find the following testimony 
with regard to this crucial matter. 
Under direct examination by Mr. Eyre, the county 
attorney, Officer Mangelson indicated the reason why he stopped 
the defendant's vehicle and the defendant in the first place. 
Q. Describe what you observed on that occasion with 
respect to the vehicle driven by Mr. Baird? 
A. The vehicle approached northbound, it was a white 
over maroon. It was a nice looking automobile. I clocked 
the vehicle at 56. I observed the vehicle had a front 
plate which was an Arizona plate. I observed that it had one 
visible occupant. 
As the vehicle went by me, I observed it had a rear 
registration plate of Arizona and there was a question on 
the validity of the plate, the validation decal as it went 
by me. 
Q. After you made those initial observations, what 
then did you do? 
A. I pulled out and proceeded North on 1-15 to try 
and get a closer look at the plate to satisfy my own mind 
that it was a valid plate. I was still unable to make that 
satisfaction in my mind and decided to stop this vehicle. 
-5-
Trial transcript, page 7. 
Thus, we can see again from the transcript of the 
trial, that Officer Mangelson showed that he had no reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed. 
It should be noted that once Officer Mangleson had 
seized defendant by pulling defendantfs car over, he 
observed various things with respect to defendant's 
automobile which he claimed made him suspicious. 
However, these observations occurred after the seizure. 
None of the observations by Officer Mangelson, which he said 
made him suspicious were mentioned as reasons he stopped 
defendant Baird's car in the first place. 
Officer Mangelsonfs testimony specifically indicates 
that he observed the various things after he had exited his 
car and was walking toward defendant's car. 
Thus, the sum of Officer Mangelson's testimony with 
respect to why he pulled over defendant's car was that he 
couldn't tell if the date decal on the license plate was 
valid. The crux of Officer Mangelson's testimony was that 
he could not explain exactly why the validation did not 
look correct but could only say "like I say, it 
just didn't look right to me." (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript, page 19.) 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that for a 
police officer to justify a seizure he has to articulate 
the facts and what his experience reveals as to those 
facts. The Supreme Court has indicated that such 
generalities as "he didn't look right" will not suffice. 
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Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S., 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed, 2d, 
357 (1979). 
In Brown, the Supreme Court found the officer's 
assertion that the defendant "looks suspicious" is 
insufficient. 443 U.S. at 52. 
Also in Brown, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous 
court and stated, "The Fourth Amendment requires that a 
seizure must be based on specific, objective facts 
indicating that society's legitimate interests required the 
seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure 
must be carried out pursuant to a plan emboding explicit, 
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. 
443 U.S. at 51. 
Utah Code Annotated, 77-7-15, reads: Authority of 
Peace Officer to stop and question suspect - Grounds: 
"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions." 
In the instant case, Officer Mangelson had less reason 
to make a seizure than the officer did in Brown, a seizure 
of which the United States Supreme Court disapproved. 
Moreover, the officerfs belief would not meet "reasonable 
suspicious standards. 
From the testimony of Officer Mangleson, he was not 
even suspicious that a crime was being committed. All 
he could articulate was that something didnft look right. 
-7-
Iff in factf Officer Mangleson did believe something was 
was suspicious it was not a reasonable suspicion and he 
could not and did not articulate the reason why he had 
such suspicion. 
In recent language/ the United States Supreme Court 
held that the police "must have a particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting a particular person stopped of 
criminal activity." U.S. vs. Cortezy 449/ U.S. 441f 
101 S.Ct. 690/ 66 L.ed. 2d 621 (1981). 
To aid this court in deciding if reasonable cause 
existed for the stop by Officer Mangelson we can examine a 
case where the United States Supreme Court listed what 
would constitute sufficient evidence to seize and stop a 
suspected vehicle. United States v. Sharpef 470 U.S. 675/ 
105 S.Ct. 1568
 f 84 L.Ed 2d 605 (1985). 
The Court in Sharpe concluded that a reasonable 
suspicion existed as to the suspected transportation of 
drugs by a vehicle. While the Officer Mangelson states that 
his suspicions were directed towards the license plate, 
Sharpe is informative as to what constitutes facts 
sufficient for reasonable suspicion. Sharpe stated that 
the reason for suspicion exists for all the following facts 
are present. 
1. Two vehicles that have traveled in tandem for 
twenty miles; 
2. The area was near the coast and known to be fre-
quented by drug traffickers; 
3. One of the vehicles was a pickup truck with a 
camper shellr often used to transport large quantities of 
marijuana; 
4* The windows of the camper were covered over with 
bedsheet material rather than curtains; 
5. The truck appeared to be handfully loaded; 
6. Both vehicles took evasive actions and started 
speeding when a state patrolman began following them. 
Assuming such a grouping of facts the Court stated 
that "taken together as appraised by an experienced law 
enforcement officer, that provided clear justification to 
stop vehicles and pursue a limited investigation/" it 
should be noted that the facts required by the Cortez case 
to constitute reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and 
pursue a limited investigation were facts, that had to 
be known by the officers before they actually stopped the 
vehicle* 470 at 682, Footnote No 3; i.e., prior knowledge. 
Sharpe is very illustrative when compared to the facts 
of the instant case. In the instant case Officer Mangelson 
was unable to articulate any facts whatsoever that provided 
grounds to a reasonable suspicion. 
In the instant casef Officer Mangelson could not articulate 
to the court what was causing him concern with the license 
decal, much less being able to articulate to the facts 
upon which his decision to stop defendant was based. The 
transcript shows that Officer Mangelson didnft believe 
anything was wrong or suspicious, but didn't feel right 
regarding the license plate. 
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Policy dictates that if all that is required by a police 
officer is that he has a feeling to see that something is 
wrong with a decal on the license plate to be able to stop 
a car, then the constitutional standard in seizing a car 
becomes a tenuous and purely subjective as compared to the 
constitutionally protected individual right. 
If this Court agrees with the Trial Court that the evi-
dence seized should be admissible this Court would be holding 
that a police officer may stop a car at his discretion. This 
discretionary kind of stop is precisely what the various United 
States Supreme Courts decisions have been trying to avoid, and 
what they say cannot be allowed to happen. 
In Delaware v. Prusey 440 F. 648 (1979) the United States 
Supreme Court held that random stops must be based upon 
reasonable suspicion in order to avoid arbitrary exercise 
and discretion on the part of the police. The Court in 
Delaware stated that road block would probably be proper 
provided that among other factors, that roadblocks "do not 
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." Other cases 
have held with respect to roadblock type searches of certain 
vehicles the lack of discretion of the police officers in 
the field was one of the major reasons for the validity of 
such roadblocks. Stark v. Terpish, 590 F. Supp. 1057, 
(D.Minn. 1984); State v. Peskins, 673 P.2d 1174 (Kan.1983). 
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In addition in case of State of Utah v. Carpena, 714, 
P2d, 674 (Utah 1986) we find a factual situation similar to 
the instant case. In that case a police car patroling a neigh-
borhood in which a large number of burglaries had recently 
occurred, observed at 3 a.m.f a slowly moving automobile 
with Arizona plates. As in our situation, the police 
officer in Carpena did not observe any criminal or traffic 
offense. The police car followed the automobile for three 
blocks and then turned on his red lights. The officer took 
some keys from the occupants of the automobile, opened the 
trunk and found 30 pounds of marijuana. In a per curium 
opinion, the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the District 
Court that the police office had no reasonable suspicion to 
make an investigatory stop. The court stated that "the 
officer had no objective facts on which to base a 
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in criminal 
activity". 714 P.2d at 675. 
When compared with Carpena, the instant case has 
less facts to enable Office Mangelson to make a stop. 
Allowing the evidence found and seized by Officer 
Mangelson because of his unconstitutional seizure and 
search, would be tantamount to giving the police the 
discretion that has been strictly prohibited by both the 
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court. 
All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the United States Constitution is inadmissible 
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in a State Court. Mapp vs. Ohiof 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 
1684f 6 L.Ed 2d 1081 (1961), State of Utah vs. Carpena, 
714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986). 
Point II 
Evidence obtained by Officer Mangelson was obtained 
after his purported reason for the stop had disappeared. 
Even granting arguendo that Officer Mangelsonfs stop 
and seizure of defendant Baird, and his car were not viola-
titive of defendant's rights, the observations and search that 
follows such were unconstitutional. Officer Mangelson 
stated that after he had pulled the defendant over and had 
stopped directly behind the defendant's vehicle, he exited 
his patrol car and came within fifteen feet of defendant's 
vehicle when he realized that the driver's license plate 
had a valid date decal on it. It was only after Officer 
Mangleson made the observation as to the license plate that 
he continued to walk towards the car and make other 
observations concerning the vehicle. (Suppression Hearing 
Transcript pages 24, 25, and 26.) Officer Mangelson was 
asked by defense counsel, Mr. Mitsunaga, whether or not 
Officer Mangelson suspected defendant Baird of any 
kind of wrongdoing after he had noticed that the license 
carried a valid date sticker. Officer Mangelson answered, 
probably not". (Page 26, Suppression Hearing Transcript.) 
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Thus after observing, that his "hunch" was incorrect 
i.e., that the date sticker was current, Officer Mangelson 
still did not have any reasonable suspicion that defendant Baird 
had committed or was commiting a crime. The stopping by 
Officer Mangelson of defendant Baird's car when he flashed his 
red spot light constituted a seizure as reflected above. 
This seizure continued, in that defendant Baird only knew that 
he had been pulled off the road by the police officer. 
Defendant Baird did not know the reason and of course, had a 
reasonable belief that he could not leave. After Officer Mangel-
son found out that the license plate was in fact valid, he had 
no right to continue the seizure or hold of defendant Baird as 
he approached defendant Bairdfs car. The purpose for Officer 
Mangelson approaching defendant's car and defendant Baird could 
only have been to make a further investigatory observation and 
require defendant Baird to produce his driver's license and 
registration. 
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
held that once a reason for a stop of a car has passed 
the police no longer had a right to continue such seizure. 
State vs. Chatton, 463 N.E., 2d 1237 (Ohio 1984) • 
In Chatton, the police officer stopped a car for 
failing to have license plates. The police officer then 
observed a temporary tag as required by law on one of the 
windows of the car. The police officer then continued to 
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the driver's side of the automobile and requested the 
driver to produce his driver's license. The police officer 
determined that the driver's license had been suspended. 
The police officer then placed the driver under arrest. 
The police officer searched the vehicle and found a gun. 
The driver was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. 
The lower appellate court reversed the trial court and the 
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the trial court. 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that once the police officer 
had observed the temporary tag, the driver could not be 
detained further to determine the validity of his driver's 
license absent some specific and articulable facts 
indicating that the detention was reasonable. 
In the instant case the trial court indicated that 
Officer Mangelson noted shortly after he exited his own car 
the decal on the license of defendant Baird's car was 
proper and that he had no further reason to continue the 
seizure of the defendant and his car. Even the incredibly 
weak reason Officer Mangelson gave as to the reason why he 
had stopped Defendant Baird in the first place was now 
gone. The various factors that Officer Mangleson stated 
that he had noticed with respect to the defendant's car, 
including new tires, new shocks, twisted off gas cap, the 
jack on backseat, and no gas key on the key ring, were 
things he noticed after he noticed the decal was valid. 
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Granting arguendo that Officer Mangelson had a reason 
to make an initial seizure of Defendant Baird and his car, 
such reason vanished as soon as Officer Mangelson noticed 
the decal on the license plate was valid. The observations 
made by Officer Mangelson after he noted the valid sticker was 
made pursuant to his seizure which had become invalid. 
Thus the observations made by Officer Mangelson and the 
checking on the validity of defendant's driver's licenser 
and car registration were also invalid, as was the 
resulting arrest and so called inventory search. 
Point III 
The search of Defendant Baird1s car was not an inventory 
search or was an improperly conducted inventory search. 
Granting arguendo that the initial seizure of 
defendant by stopping his car was valid, and granting 
agruendo that the subsequent observationsf the checking of 
defendant's driver's license and car registration and the 
arrest of Defendant Baird were validf the search of the 
defendant's locked trunk/ without his permission was a 
search made in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights and his rights under Article I, Section 14f of the 
Utah Constitution and any evidence obtained from such invalid 
search have been excluded from defendant's trial. 
The search of defendant Baird's car was made without a 
warrant and therefore was per se unreasonable under both 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
under the Constitution of Utah. Katz vs. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967); 
-15-
State vs. Romero,660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983); State vs. Harris, 
671 P.2d 175, (Utah 1983); State vs. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478 
(Utah 1981). 
It is clear that the search of the car, especially the 
locked trunk was not a mere inventory search, but rather 
was a search conducted to find evidence of crime and not to 
merely inventory the car. 
In South Dakota vs. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 
S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.ed.2d, 1000 (1976) the facts indicate 
that defendant's illegally parked car was towed to the city 
impound lot where officers first observed a watch on the 
dashboard and other items of personal property located on 
the backseat and that back floorboard, inventoried the 
contents of the car, including items found in the unlocked 
glove compartment. There he discovered a plastic bag of 
marijuana, and on this basis the defendant was convicted for 
its possession. The State Supreme Court reversed on the 
ground that the inventory had been in violation of the 4th 
Amendment and the United States Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Chief Justice in his plurality opinion, noted that the 
"diminished" expectation of privacy as to automobiles and 
other reasons customarily given for police inventories of 
impounded vehicles. 
However, Justice Powell concurring in Opperman, did 
no more than agree that "the routine inventory search was 
constitutional," . . . 
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The opinion of the plurality takes pains to 
emphasize that the owner "was not present to make other 
arrangements for the safe keeping of his belongings." 
In State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Supreme 
Court of Utah held that a so called inventory search was 
invalid because among other things, the police officer did 
not involve the owner of the vehicle, who was present, in 
his decision to conduct the search and did not permit the 
owner to make other reasonable disposition of the vehicle. 
In addition and of great importance the Court said 
that fundamental constitutional guarantees against 
unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling them 
"inventory" search. 
The dissentors in Opperman asserted that "if the 
owner of the vehicle is in police custody or otherwise in 
communication with police, is consent to the inventory is 
pre-requisite to an inventory search." 
As pointed out by LaFave in his work on Search and 
Seizure, a Treatise on The Fourth Amendment, 2nd edition, in 
speaking about Opperman said, 
"but what then in the very common situation 
which the cars is impounded incident to the 
arrest the person occupying the vehicle? Would 
that person (usually owner or someone using his 
car with his permission) at hand, should he not 
be asked whether he prefers the security which 
might result from inventory or the privacy which 
would result from no inventory? The Opperman 
dissenters certainly thought so. Further they 
assert that, "if the owners of the vehicles in 
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police custody or otherwise in communication 
with the police, his consent to the inventory 
is pre-requisite to an inventory search*n 
It cannot be stated unequivocably that those 
members of the Court subscribing to the 
plurality opinion necessarily are in disagreement 
on this pointf for that opinion takes pains to 
emphasize the owner "was not present to make 
arrangements for the safe keeping of his 
belongings." 
In the instant case as the facts brought out by the 
suppression hearing and the trial indicate, the trunk of 
the defendant's was locked and officer Mangelson used the 
keys taken from the defendant to open the trunk. Defendant 
Baird's permission was neither asked for or obtained with 
respect to the inventory search of his carf nor was he 
ever appraised of the fact that such a inventory search 
was going to take place or was taking place. 
(Suppression hearing transcript, page 12, 13, 35, 36, 
37.) 
Thus, even if an inventory search would have been valid, 
the search conducted by Officer Mangelson was not an 
inventory search but rather was made as an investigatory search 
conducted without a warrant. Neither permission from the 
defendant or any exigent circumstances justifies the 
search. Officer Mangelson was asked by defendant's counsel 
at trial, "is it normal procedure of an officer to contact 
the county attorney and the sheriff to conduct the 
inventory searches of the vehicle that you are involved 
in?" 
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A. It is not normal, no. 
Q. Okay, is that recorded under Highway Department 
policies to contact the County Attorney and the Sheriff's 
Department? 
A. Is it? 
Q. Or the Highway Patrol policy? 
A. No. 
(Trial transcript, page 24 and 25.) 
Also, Mr. Eyre, the prosecutor asked: 
Q. Was there any specific reason that you asked myself 
and the sheriff to accompany you on this vehicle inventory? 
A. Yes there is. 
Q. Why was that? 
A. I suspected a quantity of contraband in the 
vehicle, specifically marijuana, because of the smell at 
the place of the arrest. 
Other states have adopted positions similar to that 
found in Hygh. That is they held that the vehicle inventory 
must be conducted in good faith and not as a pretext and 
that this means that the discovery must be totally uncon-
templated. Gonzales v. State, 506 P.2d, 1277 (Okl.Crim. 1973). 
This Court should hold hold that even if the search of 
defendant's Baird automobile can be classified as an 
inventory type search, the fact that it was made 
specifically looking for contraband makes the search invalid 
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and therefore, that the evidence of what was found in the 
trunk should not have been allowed to have been presented at 
the defendant Baird's trial* 
Although authority exists permitting an inventory type 
search to extends to the locked trunk of the vehicle; U.S. 
v. Duncan, 763 P2d 220 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Orozcof 
715 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.1983); Colyer v. State, 9 Ark.Appl 1, 
652 S.W.2d 645 (1983). 
The better reasoned opinions indicate that inventory 
searches encompassing a locked trunk are violations of a 
defendant Baird's Fourth Amendment rights. United States 
v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1980) (inventory of 
locked trunk improper, as "the possibility of loss and the 
possibility of false claims against the police" can best be 
presented by never opening the trunk at all); Mozzetti vs. 
Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699, 94 Ca.Rptr.412, 484 P.2d 84 
(1971); People v. Grana, 185 Colo. 126, 527 P.2d 543 
(1974); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d 294 
(1975); State vs. Hatfield, 364 So.2d 578 (La.1978) 
(inventory not "reasonably restricted in scope" where 
"officers persisted in opening a locked trunk although 
defendant was unwilling"); State v. Williams, 654 S.W.2d 
238 (Mo.App.1983) (greater expectation of privacy in trunk 
and thus inventory may not be extended there where the 
"nature of the charge for which appellant was arrested 
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would indicate that she might be in custody but a short 
time"); State vs. Catlette, 88 S.D.406, 221 N.W.2d 25 
(1974); State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218 
(1980) ("property locked in the trunk of an automobile, as 
here, presents no great danger of theft"). 
The so called inventory search was in reality an 
impermissible search for contraband or evidence. 
It is clear that the search of defendant Bairdfs carf 
especially the locked trunk, was not a mere inventory 
search, but rather was a search conducted to find evidence 
of a crime. 
CONCLUSION 
The search and seizure of defendant Baird and his 
automobile was without any facts showing a reasonable 
suspicion by Officer Mangelson. Therefore the stop and 
seizure was made in violation of defendant Baird1s rights 
under both the United States and Utah Constitutions. In a 
similar manner all searches, including the so called 
inventory search which occurred after and as a result of 
the first seizure of defendant Baird were also made in 
violation of defendant Baird1s rights. 
All of the evidence obtained from these above described 
searches was therefore obtained in violation of defendant 
Baird1s rights and therefore, should have been suppressed 
at defendant Bairdfs trial. 
WHEREFORE, defendant Baird prays that this honorable 
Court reverse the guilty verdict of the lower Court. 
-21-
DATED this 24th day of November, 1987. 
JIMI MITSUNAGA 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Mailed three copies of the foregoing Brief of 
the Defendant/Appellant to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County 
Attorney, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648 this 24th 
day of November, 1987. 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
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A D D E N D U M 
JIMI MITSUNAGA #2279 
Attorney for the Defendant 
731 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-3551
 Pat P. 6rWi*o«I.G'** —^puly 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifff 
vs. 
RICHARD C. BAIRD, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANTfS MEMORANDUM ] 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUI 
Criminal No. 62-D 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COMES NOW the defendant and herewith submits the 
following Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to 
Suppress. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendant seeks to suppress all items of physical 
evidence taken from or observed in the vehicle driven by 
the defendant on February 9r 1987, by the Utah Highway 
Patrol or anyone acting in its behalff including marijuana. 
Further, defendant moves to suppress any testimony of the 
arresting officer regarding his observation of items in the 
vehicle or statements of the defendant made after the 
illegal stop. 
C'-rfc of Dl*»rtc! Court, Ivrb County 
F I L E D 
luv; -i mi 
FACTS 
On February 9, 1987f at 3:45 p.m., Trooper Magelsonf 
Sgt., Utah Highway Patrol, was parked in the center medium 
facing south outside of Nephi, Juab County, Utahr when he 
observed a front and rear plates, but could not make out the 
validation i.e.; that it had a December validation but he 
could not tell whether it was a 1986 or 1987. He had 
placed a radar gun on the vehicle and it registered at 56 
miles per hour. 
He started pursuit of the vehicle. At this point he 
had not received any radio transmission regarding this 
particular vehicle and the speed of the vehicle was not a 
factor in his decision to pursue the vehicle. 
The only reason he pursued the vehicle was that as 
the vehicle passed his position, he could see the sticker, 
but couldn't tell what it was. 
As the vehicles closed, around three to four car 
lengths, he could read "December11, but could not read the 
year. He stopped the vehicle for the sole reason to 
determine the year of the sticker. When he was within ten 
feet of the stopped vehicle, the Trooper saw that it was a 
valid Arizona 1987 validation even before he looked into 
the car. 
The trooper, having determined that the sticker was 
valid, continued to approach the vehicle and scanned it. 
There were no vehicle violations or equipment violations. 
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From the trooperfs experience, the defendant did not fit 
the profile of a suspected drug transporter. 
The trooper asked for a driver's license and vehicle 
registration and a stolen vehicle check was negative and 
the driver's license check showed that the defendant had a 
suspended license (financial responsiblity). 
The defendant was placed under arrest for driving 
under suspension and he was booked into the Juab County Jail. 
The vehicle was initially held for owner which would 
not require any inventory search. 
The vehicle was inventoried pursuant to the Utah 
Highway Patrol policy as to towed vehicles. The trooper 
obtained the car keys from the defendant's personal 
property at the jail without the knowledge or consent of 
the defendant. 
The inventory was conducted at 1715 hours in the 
presence of the County Attorney and Sheriff, persons who 
are not ordinarily invited to inventory searches. 
AGREEMENT 
That the trooperfs stop of the defendant in his 
vehicle was without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity and violated the Fourth Amendment of the U. S. Con-
stitution, Utah Constitution and UCA 77-7-15. By virtue of 
said illegal stop, the consequent search and seizure of all 
items taken from the defendant's vehicle and admission of 
the defendant should be suppressed. 
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1* 
Brown vs. Texas, 443, U.S. 47f 99 S. Ct., 2632, 66L Ed 
2d 357 (1979) sets forth the principle that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including 
detention short of traditional arrest. Whenever a police 
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to 
walk away, he has "seized" that person and the Fourth Amend-
ment requires that the seizure be reasonable. 
The Supreme Court goes on to state that the 
reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a 
traditional arrest depends upon the "balance between the 
public interest and the individual's right to personal 
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. 
"To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a 
seizure of a particular individual must be based upon 
specific, objective facts indicating that society1s 
legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular 
individual or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant 
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitation on the 
conduct of the individual officer." 
Brown vs. Texas, Supra, p363, L Ed. 
"In the absence of any basis for suspecting the 
appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public 
interest and the appellantfs rights to personal security 
and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." 
Brown vs. Texas, p 363, L Ed. 
The mandate found in Brown vs. Texas is embodied in UCA 
77-7-15 which reads: 
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"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions". 
This statute has been interpreted at least twice by the 
Utah Supreme Court. 
State vs. Swanigony 699 P2d 718 (1985) per curiam 
decision. The defendant was convicted of burglary. 
Mr. Baumgartner had been burglarized. It was 
discovered at 10:30 p.m.. Officer Young was assigned the 
case. A block from the victim1s homer Young noticed two. 
young individuals. Young called the dispatcher and 
requested broadacast of an "attempt to locate" the two 
individuals he had seen. 
Two hours later, another officer spotted the two 
individuals fitting the general description given by 
Officer Young. The second officer ordered the two 
individuals to stop and asked for identification. A 
warrant check was made and it was discovered that there was 
an outstanding traffic warrant and the two were arrested. 
In a subsequent pat down search, the officer recovered some 
of the property taken from the victim1s home. 
On appeal, the defendant sought a reversal based upon 
the erroneous admission of incriminating evidence. The 
state confessed the error, admitting that the evidence as 
seized as a result of an unlawful detention. 
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The Utah Supreme Court reverses the conviction based upon 
Brown vs. Texas, 
Again in State vs. Carpena, per curiam, 27 Utah 
Advance Reports 29 (Feb. 1986), the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the Second District trial decision in suppressing 
evidence of marijuana taken from the defendant's vehicle, 
citing UCA 77-7-15 and Brown vs. Texas. 
In the Carpena case, two officers were patroling a 
neighborhood in which a rash of burglaries had recently 
occurred. At 3 a.m., they observed a moving vehicle with 
Arizona plates. Officers did not observe any criminal 
activity or traffic offense and no report of burglaries had 
been reported. 
Officers followed the car for three blocks and turned 
on the red lights. The car turned into a driveway of a 
residence belonging to one of the occupants and the 
occupants got out of the car. After finding one unloaded 
pistol under the driver's seat, the officer removed the 
keys and opened the trunk without the consent of any of the 
occupants. Thirty pounds of marijuana was found in the trunk. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the District Court 
did not err in determining that the officer had no reasonable 
suspicion to make an investigating stop. The officer had 
no objective facts upon which to base a reasonable 
suspicion that the men was involved in criminal activity. 
In the instant case, there was no traffic violation, no 
equipment violation and no reports of any illegal activity 
-6-
/J J. 
involving this defendant or the vehicle. The trooper 
followed this vehicle because he couldn't read whether the 
sticker on the license plate was 1986 or 1987. As he 
approached the vehicle from the rear, he was able to 
discover that there was a current validation, i.e.: 1987 
sticker. 
The trooper's conduct thereafter, i.e.; his 
observation of the contents of the vehicle, identity of the 
driver, check on the vehicle and driver"s license and 
conversation with the defendant was a result of the illegal 
stop. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based upon the facts and the law, the defendant's Motion 
to Suppress all items of evidence and the conversation of the 
defendant must be suppressed. 
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987. 
Attorney for the Defendant-
Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Suppress to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County 
Attorney, at 146 North Main Street, Nephi, Utah 8i4648 this 
8th day of May, 1987. f J 
c^ j^-rlni Mitsunaga// 
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Donald J, Eyre Jr• 
Juab County Attorney 
125 North Main Street 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Te 1ephone: 623-1141 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
vs. : TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
RICHARD C. BAIRD, : Criminal No. 62-D 
Defendant. : 
Comes now the State of Utah by and through the Juab 
County Attorney and submits the following Memorandum in 
opposition to the defendants Motion to Suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A full hearing was held on defendants Motion to 
Suppress on May 8, 1987, at which time the Court became 
fully aware of the facts in this case. A brief summary is 
that on February 9, 1987 Paul Mangelson, a twenty year 
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\Ju Lb 156/ 
Pat P. 6rewwQooA.-»w* ~-~ 
veteran of the Highway Patrol was located in the median of 
1-15 in the Mona, Juab County area. He observed the 1979 
Cadi lac driven by the defendant, Richard C. Baird, which had 
Arizona license plates* Sergeant Mangelson could not 
initially determine whether the defendant's license plates 
were valid or whether they had expired* He then followed 
the vehicle for a period of time, but he still could not 
determine whether the plates had a 1986 or a 1987 
validation, so he pulled the vehicle over with the aid of 
his red light to make closer examination of the plate* It 
wasn't until he had exited his vehicle and he was within ten 
to twelve feet of the rear of defendant's vehicle that he 
determine the plates were valid* 
After determining the plates were valid, he 
simultaneously made other observations of the vehicle as he 
approached the driver's side window. He observed al1 new 
tires, new air shocks, the twisted off top to locking gas 
cap on the back seat, the bumper jack and big wrench in the 
back seat area. When the defendant rolled down his window 
he detected the smell of marijuana. 
After reviewing the defendant's driver's license and 
car registration information and requesting information from 
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his radio dispatcher. Sergeant Mangelson determined that the 
defendant's Utah driver's license was suspended and the 
subject motor vehicle was not registered to him. 
Sergeant Mangelson then made a custodial arrest of the 
defendant and the vehicle was towed to Nephi. An inventory 
search of the vehicle was subsequently made pursuant to Utah 
Highway Patrol policy and 165 lbs. of marijuana was found in 
the trunk which resulted in the present felony charge 
against the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
The actions of Sergeant Mangelson as set forth in his 
testimony at the suppression hearing were neither unlawful 
or unconstitutional under the 4th amendement or under 
Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Counsel for 
the defendant in his argument at the hearing seemed to 
acknowledge that the actions of the officer in stopping the 
defendant's vehicle to determine whether the license plates 
had valid stickers was lawful, but he merely argued that 
once the officer determined the plates were valid, he was 
obligated to stop and not have any further contact with the 
defendant. To require such conduct by a police officer is 
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clearly not the standard required by the Utah or U. S. 
Supreme Court. 
There are three separate levels of police encounters 
with the public* They are: 
<1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is 
not detained against his will. 
<2) An officer may seize a person if the officer 
has an "articulable suspicion" that the 
person has committed or is about to commit 
a crime; however the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop j 
(3) An officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. See Florida v. Rover. 460 
U.S. 491, 498-499 (1983) 
Sergeant Mangelson's actions in initially stopping the 
vehicle comes within criteria No. 2 in that he had an 
articulable reason for stopping the vehicle. Once he 
discovered the vehicle had valid plates his approach of the 
driver came within criteria No. 1, moreover, even before the 
officer had direct contact with the defendant he made 
observations in or about the vehicle which again gave him an 
articulable reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the 
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defendant, which subsequently resulted in the lawful seizure 
of the 165 lbs, of marijuana. 
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions 
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terrv 
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Brown v. Texas. 443 U. S. 47 
(1979) and is codified in section 77-7-15 U.C.A. as follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Clearly Officer Mangelson had an articulable reasonable 
suspicion to make the initial stop of the defendant and 
would be an absurd interpretation of the above principal of 
law, to require the officer to walk away from the vehicle 
once he had determined the plates were valid. Mere common 
courtesy would permit the officer to approach the driver to 
explain the stop. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Torres. 
29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973) considered the stop and 
detention situation. In that case the Court said, "that the 
test to be applied on the question as to whether" 
appellants constitutional rights have been abridged: 
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. . .is one of reasonableness: that is whether 
fair-minded persons, knowing the facts, and taking 
into consideration not only the rights of the 
individuals involved in the inquiry or search, but 
also the broader interests of the public to be 
protected from crime and criminals, would regard 
the conduct of the officers as being unreasonable. 
Under the present fact situation the approach by Officer 
Mangelson of the defendant after he had determined that the 
license plates were valid was not an unreasonable act and 
therefore the evidence should not be suppressed. 
Even if the Court finds that the acts of Officer 
Mangelson violated the defendant's constitutional rights in 
some manner, before the Court can suppress the subject 
evidence the Court must find pursuant to section 77-35-12 
<g) that the violation must be substantial and that the 
offficer did not act in good faith. In the present case the 
defendant's expectation of privacy could not have been very 
great, he was not lawfully on the highway (his driving 
privilege in Utah was suspended), the vehicle in which he 
was traveling did not belong to him, and the unlawful 
detention by the officer, if any, was minimally intrusive 
and lasted no longer than reasonably necessary to effect its 
purpose. Further there was no evidence that Officer 
Mangelson acted in bad faith. Absent a showing of a 
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substantial violation or evidence of bad faith, there should 
not be an exclusion of the subject evidence. See United 
SUtgg V, LgQn, 468 U. S. 897 (1984). 
For all the foregoing reasons the defendants Motion to 
Suppress should be denied. 
Dated this W day bf May, 1987. 
Donald J. Eyre J 
Juab County Attorney 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Suppress to Jimi 
Mitsunaga, Attorney for Defendant, 731 East South^Temple 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102v>n this /^f da y of 
May, 1987. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH Pat P. 6reenwood,C!wk—Deputy 
* * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD C. BAIRD, 
Defendant. 
Case Number 62-D 
RULING 
******** 
This matter is before the court on defendant Richard C. 
Baird's Motion to Suppress and pursuant to Rule 3.5, Rules of 
Practice of the District Courts, an evidentiary hearing was heard 
on May 8, 1987. 
FACTS 
On February 9, 1987, Officer Paul Officer Mangelson, 
Utah Highway Patrol, was parked on the median of 1-15 in the 
Mona, Juab County - area. At about 3:45 p.m. Officer Mangelson 
observed the defendant driving a vehicle with Arizona license 
plates. He could not make out whether the December validation 
sticker was for the year 1986 or 1987. Officer Mangelson pursued 
the vehicle but still could not determine the year on the 
validation sticker. The defendant was registered on a radar gun 
at 56 M.P.H. Finally, Officer Mangelson pulled the vehicle over 
to make a closer examination of the license plate. After exiting 
his vehicle, Officer Mangelson approached the vehicle the 
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defendant was driving. About ten to twelve feet from the vehicle 
Officer Mangelson determined the validation sticker to be 
current. As he continued to approach the defendant he made 
several observations which concerned him such as new tires, new 
air shocks, a twisted off locking gas cap on the back seat, and a 
bumper jack and a lug wrench in the back seat area. 
Additionally, Officer Mangelson detected the smell of marijuana 
when the defendant rolled down his window. Officer Mangelson 
inspected the defendant's driver license and car registration and 
subsequently determined that the defendant's license was 
suspended and that the vehicle was not registered to him. The 
defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license and 
booked into the Juab County jail. The defendant's vehicle was 
towed to Nephi and an inventory search of the vehicle conducted. 
The search yielded 165 lbs. of marijuana. 
DISCUSSION 
The defendant argues that Officer Mangelson's stop was 
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and therefore 
violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Utah 
Constitution and Section 77-7-15 U.C.A.. The text of Section 77-
7-15 U.C.A. is recited for the court: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
The court is also referred to three cases in connection with this 
argument. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) and State v. 
Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); and State v. Carpena, 714 
2 
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P.2d 675 (Utah 1986). Carpena refers to Swanigan which in turn 
quotes Brown for the principle stated in Section 77-7-15 
LLC.A. —• that "[a] brief investigatory stop of an individual by 
police officers is permissible when the officers 'have a 
reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity.' " Swanigan, at 719, 
quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
The state's response is that defendant apparently does 
not challenge the stopping of the vehicle, but argues that upon 
determining that the validation sticker was current, Officer 
Mangelson was obligated to stop and not have any further contact 
with the defendant. The state claims that such conduct is not 
the standard required by the U.S. or Utah Supreme Courts. The 
court is referred, first of all, to Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491 (1983) for an explanation of three levels of police contact 
with the public. 
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time 
and question him so long as he is not, even 
momentarily, detained without objective grounds to do 
so; 
(2) An officer may seize a person if there is an 
articulable suspicion that the person has committed or 
is about to commit a crime so long as the detention is 
temporary and lasts no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop; and 
(3) An officer may arrest a suspect if the 
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has 
been or is being committed 
The state cites Brown and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
(1968) for the appropriate standards of investigative detentions, 
as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court and as codified in 
Section 77-7-15 U.C.A.. Finally, the court is referred to State 
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v. Torres, 129 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973). In that case 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It should be kept in mind that the test to be applied 
on the question as to whether there has been a 
violation of . . . constitutional rights . . . is one 
of reasonableness: that is, whether fair-minded 
persons, knowing the facts, and taking into 
consideration not only the rights of the individuals 
involved in the inquiry or search, but also the broader 
interests of the public to be protected from crime and 
criminals, would regard the conduct of the officers as 
being unreasonable. 
Referring to the levels of police-public encounters 
listed above, Officer Mangelson1s actions in initially stopping 
the defendant fall within the parameters of level two. Officer 
Mangelson suspected the defendant of driving a vehicle with an 
expired validation sticker. As Officer Mangelson approached the 
vehicle his suspicions were allayed and the defendant fell within 
the constraints of a level one type of encounter. At this point 
Officer Mangelson could have approached the defendant and posed 
questions so long as the defendant was not detained against his 
will. It is not reasonable that Officer Mangelson would have 
turned around and simply walked away from the defendant without 
explanation after having made the stop. Instead, as Officer 
Mangelson approached the defendant his suspicions were once again 
aroused as to the possibility of illegal activity by his 
cumulative observations of new tires, new air shocks, a twisted 
off locking gas cap on the back seat, a bumper jack and a lug 
wrench in the back seat area, together with the smell of 
marijuana emanating from the defendant's vehicle. Officer 
Mangelson1s encounter with the defendant had once again risen to 
the second level. Officer Mangelson further determined that the 
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defendant was driving a vehicle registered to another person, and 
defendant could not give Officer Mangelson the address of the 
registered owner. It was also determined the defendant was 
driving on a suspended driver license, thus Officer Mangelsonfs 
actions in arresting the defendant were elevated to the third 
level of police-public encounters. Officer Mangelson had 
probable cause to believe that an offense had been or was being 
committed. Therefore, defendant's claim that Officer Mangelson1s 
conduct, i.e., his observation of the contents of the vehicle, 
identity of the driver, check on the vehicle and driver's license 
and conversation with the defendant was a result of the illegal 
stop is without merit. 
RULING 
Defendant Richard C. Bairdfs Motion to Suppress is 
denied. 
DATED at Provo, Utah, this^/9 day of May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Jimi Mitsunaga 
Juab County Attorney 
c 
